Order Sustaining Defendants' Demurrer To The First Amended Complaint Without Leave To Amend (see Scanned Order For Details)
This opinion contains at least one quotation that does not appear verbatim in the original cited source and the unusual statement "default is an adjudication on the merits" with no source.
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KING & SPALDING LLP
Jeanne A. Fugate (SBN 236341)
jfugate@kslaw.com
Kelly Perigoe (SBN 268872)
kperigoe@kslaw.com
50 California Street, Suite 3300
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: (415) 318-1200
Fax: (415) 318-1300
KING & SPALDING LLP
Damien Marshall (Pro Hac Vice Application Submitted)
dmarshall@kslaw.com
1185 Avenue of the Americas, 34th Floor
New York, NY 10036
Telephone: (212) 556-2100
Fax: (212) 556-2222
FILED
San Francisco County Superior Court
MAY. 07 22K
CLitin OF THe UOUR
By: Depuly Clerk
f
Attorneys for Defendants CHRISTIAN LARSEN and
Defendant and Cross-complainant RIPPLE LABS INC.
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
JANE DOE, an individual,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
CHRISTIAN LARSEN, and Does.1 through 10
inclusive
Defendant.
Case No. CGC-23-611166
ih
LoxbposEp) ORDER SUSTAINING
DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER TO THE
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND
RIPPLE LABS INC.,
Cross-Complainant,
Vv.
JANE DOE a/k/a JULIA G. KO,
Cross-Defendant.
Date: May 7, 2025
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept.: 302
Action Filed: | December 19, 2023
First Amended Complaint Filed: April 15, 2024
Cross-Complaint Filed: July 16, 2024
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eo
PROPOSED] ORDER
Having duly considered the papers filed in support of Defendant Christian Larsen’s and
Defendant and Cross-Complainant Ripple Labs Inc.’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Demurrer to
the First Amended Complaint of Jane Doe, and cause appearing therefore, the Court rules as
follows: .
Defendants’ demurrer to the First Amended Complaint (FAC) is SUSTAINED WITHOUT
LEAVE TO AMEND.
On December 19, 2023, Plaintiff Jane Doe sued Christian Larsen and Ripple Labs, Inc.,
after she attended a business meeting with Defendant Larsen in San Francisco. Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant Larsen groped and attempted to kiss Plaintiff during the meeting. In the operative
First Amended, Complaint (FAC), Plaintiff alleges causes of action for: (1) sexual battery, (2)
sexual assault, (3) denial of civil rights, and (4) gender violence.
Before this action was filed, on October 3, 2022, Defendant Larsen filed a lawsuit (CGC-
22-602138) against Plaintiff for declaratory relief. In that complaint, Defendant Larsen requested
declaratory relief that the allegations in an attached draft complaint were false. (RJN, Exhibit 1.)
The attached draft complaint was drafted by an attorney representing Plaintiff and alleged
essentially the same conduct Plaintiff alleges in this action and the same claims (along with a few
that are not in the current suit). The court entered a default judgment on December 1, 2023,
declaring “Christian Larsen did not engage in the conduct described in Exhibit A to plaintiff
Christian Larsen’s complaint in this action.” (RJN, Exhibit 5, Page 2.) Plaintiff appealed, causing
this court to order a stay to be dissolved when remittitur was issued in the related action. Remittitur
was issued on December 12, 2024, upholding the default judgment.
The issue on demurrer under section 430.10(e) is, taking the facts properly pleaded and
properly noticed as true, does the challenged cause of action necessarily fail to state a cause for
relief. (See CCP section 430.10(e); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In assessing
whether the complaint states a cause of action, the court accepts all properly pleaded material facts,
but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Minton v. Dignity Health (2019),
39 Cal.App.Sth 1155, 1 161.) “[I]f, on consideration of all facts stated, it appears that plaintiff is
2
entitled to any relief against defendant, the complaint will be held good, though facts may not be
clearly stated, or may be intermingled with a statement of other facts irrelevant to cause of action
shown, or though plaintiff may demand relief to which he is not entitled under facts
alleged.” (Augustine v. Trucco (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 229, 236, quoting Matteson v. Wagoner
(1905) 147 Cal. 739, 742.)
1. Res Judicata
As apreliminary matter, Defendants conflate issue and claim preclusion. In their statement
of demurrer, notice of motion, and headings, they argue res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars this
lawsuit. Then, in their memorandum of points and authorities, they argue that “Plaintiff is
precluded from relitigating the issue of whether Mr. Larsen engaged in the conduct complained of
during the January 2018 encounter...” (MPA, 17.) Defendants also describe the collateral estoppel
aspect of the res judicata doctrine. (Id.)
“Preclusion comes in two main forms: claim preclusion and issue preclusion.” (Grande v.
Eisenhower Medical Center (2022) 13 Cal.5th 313, 323.) The two forms were previously under
the umbrella term of res judicata, but now have separate names and elements. (Samara v. Matar
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 326.) “Claim and issue preclusion have different requirements. We have
described claim preclusion as applying only when a second suit involves (1) the same cause of
action (2) between the same parties [or their privies] (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the
first suit. Issue preclusion, by contrast, applies only (1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical
issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who
was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (Grande, 13 Cal.5th at 323 (internal
citations and quotations omitted).)
Plaintiff argues that neither form of preclusion applies if the previous judgment was the
result of fraud. She claims the fraud here was serving that complaint improperly. However, the
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s refusal to relieve her of the default judgment for that
very reason, improper service. The finding, which is now part of a final judgment, is law of the
case and binding here. Plaintiff provides no basis for not treating this issue as resolved. Thus, the
court accepts it as settled that Defendant did not commit fraud or serve the complaint improperly.
3
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A. Claim Preclusion
The elements of claim preclusion are met here. First, this suit involves the same causes of
action as the previous suit. While the relief sought was different, there can be no doubt that the
first judgment resolved al the claims presented in the Plaintiffs substantially similar draft
complaint against her. (See Mercola v. Chester (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 140, 143 [declaratory
judgment has a preclusive effect with respect to all questions essential to and determined by the
judgment]; Gates v. Superior Court (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 301, 308; 26 Cal. Jur. 3d Declaratory
Relief Section 93 [declaratory judgment is res judicata with respect to all questions essential to
and determined by the judgment.”].) The two actions were between the same parties or their
privies. And the merits of Plaintiffs current allegations and claims were necessarily and
definitively resolved in the first action against Plaintiff. A default is an adjudication on the
merits. The judgment in the first action is now final. Given the claims Against Defendant Larsen
fail, it follows the claims against Defendant Ripple Labs, Inc. fail because Plaintiff's theory of
liability is Ripple is vicariously liable for the results of Larsen’s misconduct, which the first
judgment definitively resolved did not occur. Plaintiff has not identified a basis by which she can
cure this fundamental defect with her current claims. Thus, the demurrer is sustained without leave
to amend under claim preclusion as to both Defendants.
B. Issue Preclusion
In addition, issue preclusion bars Plaintiff’s claims. Issue preclusion applies: (1) after final
adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit
and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.
(Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.) The judgment in the first action is final. In
the first action, the court adjudicated the issues presented in this action. The issues were actually
litigated and necessarily decided in the first action; otherwise, it would not have been possible for
the court to order the relief it did. And the preclusion is being asserted against Plaintiff Doe, who
was a party to the first action. The court’s determination in the related action that “Christian Larsen
did not engage in the conduct described in Exhibit A to plaintiff Christian Larsen’s complaint in
this action” is binding on the factual issues alleged here. The only factual basis for Plaintiff's
4
causes of action appears to be the conduct by Defendant Larsen, which was already adjudicated to
have not occurred. Thus, all the claims fail as to him. Defendant Ripple Labs, Inc.’s liability is
premised entirely on the factual allegations against Defendant Larsen. The entire complaint hinges
on Defendant Larsen’s conduct; thus, leave to amend is inappropriate. The demurrer is sustained
without leave to amend on issue preclusion grounds.
2, Other grounds for demurrer
The demurrer is sustained on the following independent grounds as well.
A. Vicarious liability
Defendants assert the FAC fails to allege sufficient facts to plead that Defendant Ripple
Labs is vicariously liable for all claims. The FAC asserts only that “Defendant acted in the course
and scope of his employment with the consent, agency or permission, of all Ripple Labs,
Inc.” (FAC, 2.) This assertion is a conclusion of law and is disregarded. All claims against Ripple
Labs, Inc. fail for lack of support.
Next, Defendants assert that Ripple Labs cannot be held liable for Gender Violence under
Civil Code section 52.4(e). This is persuasive. This subdivision provides: “Notwithstanding any
other laws that may establish the liability of an employer for the acts of an employee, this section
does not establish any civil liability of a person because of his or her status as an employer, unless
the employer personally committed an act of gender violence. There is no allegation in the FAC
that Ripple Labs committed any acts of gender violence. The complaint only ever describes Ripple
Labs as vicariously liable. The third cause of action against Ripple Labs fails for this reason as
well.
B. Statute of Limitations
Last, Defendants assert the relevant statutes of limitations bar the third and fourth causes
of action. As to the third cause of action, the court’s ruling above moots the issue. On the fourth
cause of action, it appears that even with the tolling agreements, this claim is barred by the statute
of limitations. Plaintiff concedes that the tolling agreements extended the limitations period by
approximately 15 months. If the incident occurred in January 2018, and the statute of limitations
on the Unruh claim (the fourth cause of action) is three years; even with all tolling the limitations
5
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period would have run well before December 2023. The fourth cause of action, thus, fails under
the statute of limitations.
Finally, Defendants’ request for judicial notice (RJN) under California Evidence Code
Section 452(d) is granted. Notice is limited to the relevant facts properly subject to notice given
the materials presented and does not, for example, extend to the truth of assertions in pleadings or
transcripts. (See Richtek USA, Inc. v. UPI Semiconductor Corp. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 651, 659-
660.) “Although the existence of a document may be judicially noticeable, the truth of statements
contained in the document and its proper interpretation are not subject to judicial notice if those
matters are reasonably, disputable.” (Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp. (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 97, 114.) Vv
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: _who, 4 202s Boe
DGE ERIOR COURT
[PROPOSED] ORDER
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KING & SPALDING LLP
Jeanne A. Fugate (SBN 236341)
jfugate@kslaw.com
Kelly Perigoe (SBN 268872)
kperigoe@kslaw.com
50 California Street, Suite 3300
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: (415) 318-1200
Fax: (415) 318-1300
KING & SPALDING LLP
Damien Marshall (Pro Hac Vice Application Submitted)
dmarshall@kslaw.com
1185 Avenue of the Americas, 34th Floor
New York, NY 10036
Telephone: (212) 556-2100
Fax: (212) 556-2222
FILED
San Francisco County Superior Court
MAY. 07 22K
CLitin OF THe UOUR
By: Depuly Clerk
f
Attorneys for Defendants CHRISTIAN LARSEN and
Defendant and Cross-complainant RIPPLE LABS INC.
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
JANE DOE, an individual,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
CHRISTIAN LARSEN, and Does.1 through 10
inclusive
Defendant.
Case No. CGC-23-611166
ih
LoxbposEp) ORDER SUSTAINING
DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER TO THE
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND
RIPPLE LABS INC.,
Cross-Complainant,
Vv.
JANE DOE a/k/a JULIA G. KO,
Cross-Defendant.
Date: May 7, 2025
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept.: 302
Action Filed: | December 19, 2023
First Amended Complaint Filed: April 15, 2024
Cross-Complaint Filed: July 16, 2024
t
il
{PREPOSEP] ORDER
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eo
PROPOSED] ORDER
Having duly considered the papers filed in support of Defendant Christian Larsen’s and
Defendant and Cross-Complainant Ripple Labs Inc.’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Demurrer to
the First Amended Complaint of Jane Doe, and cause appearing therefore, the Court rules as
follows: .
Defendants’ demurrer to the First Amended Complaint (FAC) is SUSTAINED WITHOUT
LEAVE TO AMEND.
On December 19, 2023, Plaintiff Jane Doe sued Christian Larsen and Ripple Labs, Inc.,
after she attended a business meeting with Defendant Larsen in San Francisco. Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant Larsen groped and attempted to kiss Plaintiff during the meeting. In the operative
First Amended, Complaint (FAC), Plaintiff alleges causes of action for: (1) sexual battery, (2)
sexual assault, (3) denial of civil rights, and (4) gender violence.
Before this action was filed, on October 3, 2022, Defendant Larsen filed a lawsuit (CGC-
22-602138) against Plaintiff for declaratory relief. In that complaint, Defendant Larsen requested
declaratory relief that the allegations in an attached draft complaint were false. (RJN, Exhibit 1.)
The attached draft complaint was drafted by an attorney representing Plaintiff and alleged
essentially the same conduct Plaintiff alleges in this action and the same claims (along with a few
that are not in the current suit). The court entered a default judgment on December 1, 2023,
declaring “Christian Larsen did not engage in the conduct described in Exhibit A to plaintiff
Christian Larsen’s complaint in this action.” (RJN, Exhibit 5, Page 2.) Plaintiff appealed, causing
this court to order a stay to be dissolved when remittitur was issued in the related action. Remittitur
was issued on December 12, 2024, upholding the default judgment.
The issue on demurrer under section 430.10(e) is, taking the facts properly pleaded and
properly noticed as true, does the challenged cause of action necessarily fail to state a cause for
relief. (See CCP section 430.10(e); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In assessing
whether the complaint states a cause of action, the court accepts all properly pleaded material facts,
but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Minton v. Dignity Health (2019),
39 Cal.App.Sth 1155, 1 161.) “[I]f, on consideration of all facts stated, it appears that plaintiff is
2
[PROPOSED] ORDER
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entitled to any relief against defendant, the complaint will be held good, though facts may not be
clearly stated, or may be intermingled with a statement of other facts irrelevant to cause of action
shown, or though plaintiff may demand relief to which he is not entitled under facts
alleged.” (Augustine v. Trucco (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 229, 236, quoting Matteson v. Wagoner
(1905) 147 Cal. 739, 742.)
1. Res Judicata
As apreliminary matter, Defendants conflate issue and claim preclusion. In their statement
of demurrer, notice of motion, and headings, they argue res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars this
lawsuit. Then, in their memorandum of points and authorities, they argue that “Plaintiff is
precluded from relitigating the issue of whether Mr. Larsen engaged in the conduct complained of
during the January 2018 encounter...” (MPA, 17.) Defendants also describe the collateral estoppel
aspect of the res judicata doctrine. (Id.)
“Preclusion comes in two main forms: claim preclusion and issue preclusion.” (Grande v.
Eisenhower Medical Center (2022) 13 Cal.5th 313, 323.) The two forms were previously under
the umbrella term of res judicata, but now have separate names and elements. (Samara v. Matar
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 326.) “Claim and issue preclusion have different requirements. We have
described claim preclusion as applying only when a second suit involves (1) the same cause of
action (2) between the same parties [or their privies] (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the
first suit. Issue preclusion, by contrast, applies only (1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical
issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who
was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (Grande, 13 Cal.5th at 323 (internal
citations and quotations omitted).)
Plaintiff argues that neither form of preclusion applies if the previous judgment was the
result of fraud. She claims the fraud here was serving that complaint improperly. However, the
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s refusal to relieve her of the default judgment for that
very reason, improper service. The finding, which is now part of a final judgment, is law of the
case and binding here. Plaintiff provides no basis for not treating this issue as resolved. Thus, the
court accepts it as settled that Defendant did not commit fraud or serve the complaint improperly.
3
[PR@POSED] ORDER
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A. Claim Preclusion
The elements of claim preclusion are met here. First, this suit involves the same causes of
action as the previous suit. While the relief sought was different, there can be no doubt that the
first judgment resolved al the claims presented in the Plaintiffs substantially similar draft
complaint against her. (See Mercola v. Chester (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 140, 143 [declaratory
judgment has a preclusive effect with respect to all questions essential to and determined by the
judgment]; Gates v. Superior Court (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 301, 308; 26 Cal. Jur. 3d Declaratory
Relief Section 93 [declaratory judgment is res judicata with respect to all questions essential to
and determined by the judgment.”].) The two actions were between the same parties or their
privies. And the merits of Plaintiffs current allegations and claims were necessarily and
definitively resolved in the first action against Plaintiff. A default is an adjudication on the
merits. The judgment in the first action is now final. Given the claims Against Defendant Larsen
fail, it follows the claims against Defendant Ripple Labs, Inc. fail because Plaintiff's theory of
liability is Ripple is vicariously liable for the results of Larsen’s misconduct, which the first
judgment definitively resolved did not occur. Plaintiff has not identified a basis by which she can
cure this fundamental defect with her current claims. Thus, the demurrer is sustained without leave
to amend under claim preclusion as to both Defendants.
B. Issue Preclusion
In addition, issue preclusion bars Plaintiff’s claims. Issue preclusion applies: (1) after final
adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit
and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.
(Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.) The judgment in the first action is final. In
the first action, the court adjudicated the issues presented in this action. The issues were actually
litigated and necessarily decided in the first action; otherwise, it would not have been possible for
the court to order the relief it did. And the preclusion is being asserted against Plaintiff Doe, who
was a party to the first action. The court’s determination in the related action that “Christian Larsen
did not engage in the conduct described in Exhibit A to plaintiff Christian Larsen’s complaint in
this action” is binding on the factual issues alleged here. The only factual basis for Plaintiff's
4
[PROP ] ORDER
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causes of action appears to be the conduct by Defendant Larsen, which was already adjudicated to
have not occurred. Thus, all the claims fail as to him. Defendant Ripple Labs, Inc.’s liability is
premised entirely on the factual allegations against Defendant Larsen. The entire complaint hinges
on Defendant Larsen’s conduct; thus, leave to amend is inappropriate. The demurrer is sustained
without leave to amend on issue preclusion grounds.
2, Other grounds for demurrer
The demurrer is sustained on the following independent grounds as well.
A. Vicarious liability
Defendants assert the FAC fails to allege sufficient facts to plead that Defendant Ripple
Labs is vicariously liable for all claims. The FAC asserts only that “Defendant acted in the course
and scope of his employment with the consent, agency or permission, of all Ripple Labs,
Inc.” (FAC, 2.) This assertion is a conclusion of law and is disregarded. All claims against Ripple
Labs, Inc. fail for lack of support.
Next, Defendants assert that Ripple Labs cannot be held liable for Gender Violence under
Civil Code section 52.4(e). This is persuasive. This subdivision provides: “Notwithstanding any
other laws that may establish the liability of an employer for the acts of an employee, this section
does not establish any civil liability of a person because of his or her status as an employer, unless
the employer personally committed an act of gender violence. There is no allegation in the FAC
that Ripple Labs committed any acts of gender violence. The complaint only ever describes Ripple
Labs as vicariously liable. The third cause of action against Ripple Labs fails for this reason as
well.
B. Statute of Limitations
Last, Defendants assert the relevant statutes of limitations bar the third and fourth causes
of action. As to the third cause of action, the court’s ruling above moots the issue. On the fourth
cause of action, it appears that even with the tolling agreements, this claim is barred by the statute
of limitations. Plaintiff concedes that the tolling agreements extended the limitations period by
approximately 15 months. If the incident occurred in January 2018, and the statute of limitations
on the Unruh claim (the fourth cause of action) is three years; even with all tolling the limitations
5
_[PROPOSED] ORDER
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period would have run well before December 2023. The fourth cause of action, thus, fails under
the statute of limitations.
Finally, Defendants’ request for judicial notice (RJN) under California Evidence Code
Section 452(d) is granted. Notice is limited to the relevant facts properly subject to notice given
the materials presented and does not, for example, extend to the truth of assertions in pleadings or
transcripts. (See Richtek USA, Inc. v. UPI Semiconductor Corp. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 651, 659-
660.) “Although the existence of a document may be judicially noticeable, the truth of statements
contained in the document and its proper interpretation are not subject to judicial notice if those
matters are reasonably, disputable.” (Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp. (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 97, 114.) Vv
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: _who, 4 202s Boe
DGE ERIOR COURT
[PROPOSED] ORDER
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