Order ; Amended Order Granting Defendants Elon Musk, Tesla, Inc., The Elon Musk Revocable Trust, Excession, Llc, Jared Birchall, Singer Cashman, Llp, Allison Huebert, Adam S. Cashman, Adam G. Mehes, And Alex Spiro's Special Motion To Strike (see Scanned Order For Details)
This opinion contains quotations that do not appear verbatim in the original cited source, citations that do not exist, citations used for the opposite of what they actually hold, and numerous typographical errors.
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FILED
San-Francisco County Superior Court~ ~~
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
AARON GREENSPAN, an individual,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
ELON MUSK, an individual, TESLA, INC., a
Delaware corporation, THE ELON MUSK
REVOCABLE TRUST DATED JULY 22, 2003,
a trust, X CORP., a Nevada corporation formerly
known as TWITTER, INC., EXCESSION, LLC, °
a Texas Limited Liability Company, JARED
BIRCHALL, an individual, MORGAN
STANLEY & COMPANY, LLC, a Delaware
Limited Liability Company, OMAR QAZI, an
individual, SMICK ENTERPRISES, INC., a
Delaware corporation, SINGER CASHMAN,
LLP, a California partnership, ADAM S.
CASHMAN, an individual, ALLISON
HUEBERT, an individual, ADAM G. MEHES,
an individual, and ALEX SPIRO, an individual,
and DOES 1-10, inclusive.
Defendants.
DY
Case No. CGC-24-615352
ull AmEenPED
RDER G TING
DEFENDANTS ELON MUSK, TESLA,
INC., THE ELON MUSK REVOCABLE
TRUST, EXCESSION, LLC, JARED
BIRCHALL, SINGER CASHMAN,
LLP, ALLISON HUEBERT, ADAM S.
CASHMAN, ADAM G. MEHES, AND
ALEX SPIRO’S SPECIAL MOTION
TO STRIKE —
Date: November 12, 2025
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Department: 302
Complaint Filed: June 12, 2024
FAC Filed: August 28, 2024
Remand Received: July 28, 2025
Trial Date: None set
[Remanded From Northern District of
California Case No. 3:24-cv-04647-MMC]
Case No. CGC-24-615352
PROPOS | ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKEPage 2 Hus |
i . ont .
AMENDOY
Pro d rderY)
Defendants Elon Musk; Tesla, Inc.; The Elon Musk Revocable Trust Dated July 22, 2003;
Excession, LLC; Jared Birchall; Singer Cashman LLP; Allison Huebert; Adam S. Cashman; Adam G.
Mehes; and Alex Spiro’s special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Aaron Greenspan identifies as a software developer, investor and short seller. Historically
he has shorted Tesla stock. He‘alleges that Defendants defamed him, defrauded him, stalked him, engaged
in unfair business practices, falsely advertised their products and inflicted emotional distress upon him.
His allegations are based principally on Defendants’ social media posts and public appearances, as well
recy lator
as repulater aiid litigation activity. The parties enjoy a long history of litigation with each other. In 2020,
Plaintiff sued some of the Moving Defendants in the federal district court (“First Action”). The federal
court dismissed the First Action, which dismissal was upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal. In the
meantime, some Defendants here sued Plaintiff in Alameda Superior Court (“Second Action”).
Ultimately, Defendants soon dismissed this action. After the dismissal, Plaintiff sought to file a cross-
complaint in the Alameda Superior Court, which effort failed. In 2024, Plaintiff filed the complaint in this —
action (“Third Action”). Plaintiff alleged 20 causes of action against 14 defendants. Based on Plaintiff s
federal securities and RICO claims, Defendants removed the action to federal court. On July 17, 2025, the
federal district court dismissed all federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state ‘
claims. Defendants’ pending anti-SLAPP motion was denied as moot. On July 28, 2025, the remaining :
state claims were remanded to this court: only Counts IV-XX remain. Moving Defendants now move to
strike 3 ae (Gectrities Fraud under Corp. Code 25400, 25500), V (Securities Fraud under Corp.
Code 25401, 25501), VI (Assistance Committing Securities Fraud), VII (Fraud), VIII (Negligent
Misrepresentation), X (Defamation per se), XIII (NIED), XIV (Fraud on the Court), XV (Negligence),
and XVII (UCL). Moving Defendants bring a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute
contending Plaintiffs causes of action against them arise from their speech and petitioning activity and
|| Plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing on any of his claims. Plaintiff opposes the motion. .
Evidentiary Rulings
Defendants’ request for judicial notice is ruled on as follows. The court denies the request as to
Exhibits A, B, C, and D. The court grants the request as to Exhibits E and F, which are unopposed. The
1Z. ,
Ofer trtenolenl Fert see-pp-1,2,3,4, 5, oF ) Case No, CGC-24-615352
PROROSE ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKEPage 3 Leet
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|| of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16,
——|
court denies the request as to Exhibits G, H, I, and J. The court grants the request as to Exhibit K, L, M,
N, and O, which are unopposed. The court denies the request as to Exhibit Q. °
Anti-SLAPP Analysis ,
“SLAPP” is an acronym for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, which are lawsuits
designed to chill the exercise of speech and petition rights. “The anti-SLAPP statute helps ‘combat
lawsuits designed to chill the exercise of free speech and petition rights’” (Park v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060.) Section 425.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides for a special motion to strike ‘[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution
or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue.’ (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)”
(Cabrera y. Alam (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1085.)
In deciding the merits of an anti-SLAPP motion, the court undertakes a two-step analysis. The first
step addresses whether a claim “arises from protected activity.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 1062.) A claim
“arises from protected activity” when “protected activity” forms a basis for the defendant’s liability. (Id.)
Put another way, to satisfy the requirements of the first prong, the defendant must show that protected
activity constitutes the “wrongful act forming the basis for ... liability” on that claim. (C.W. Howe
Partners Inc. v. Mooradian (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 688, 701.) “Protected activity,” in tum, is statutorily
defined. To meet prong one, defendants must show that plaintiff's claims arise from:
| (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing
made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial
body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made
in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any
other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right
subd. (e)(1)-(4).) >
The court broadly construes the anti-SLAPP statute and considers “the pleadings and supporting
and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based” to determine whether
2 Case No. CGC-24-615352
[PBO@POSED} ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
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the claims implicate protected petitioning activity under section 425.16(e). (Equilon Enters. v. Consumer
Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67; Code Civ. Proc., 425.16, subds. (a) & (b)(2).) The “critical
consideration” of the prong one test is “whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected
free speech or petitioning activity.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.) “The anti-SLAPP
statute’s definitional focus is not the form of the plaintiff's cause of action but, rather, the defendant’s
activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability — and whether that activity constitutes protected
speech or petitioning.” (Jd. at 92.) If the defendant fails to satisfy.this burden, then the special motion to
strike must be denied. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 76.) -
If the court finds the moving party has carried its burden on prong one the analysis moves to the
second prong. There, the court must decide whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of
prevailing on the challenged cause of action. (City of Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 76.) Plaintiffs must
“demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a prima facie showing of facts
to sustain a favorable judgment.” (Premier Med. Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee
Assn. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 464, 476.) Plaintiff need only demonstrate minimal merit. (Grewal v.
Jammu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977, 989.) In making this determination, the Court. does “not weigh
credibility, nor do[es] [it] evaluate weight to the evidence. Instead, [the Court] accepts as true all evidence
favorable to the plaintiff and assesses the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff's
submission as a matter of law.” (Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th
688, 699-700.) - jonok 3) that the bommenenel preceh exeeptin url Coleg Cri
Procedural Issues - awe ere m 125.14 (é) erplige " f
As a threshold issue, Plaintiff claims that 1) Moving Defendants’ motion was untimely, amd 2) the
coust lacks jurisdictiori over certain Defendants and claimg. The court is unpersuaded by eee ments,
First, when a case is remanded from federal court to state court, defendants receive a new 60-day
window to file an anti-SLAPP motion, measured from the date of remand. (Morin v. Rosenthal (2004)
122 Cal.App.4th 673) This case was remanded from federal court on July 17, 2025. (Alden Decl. Ex. K.)
Therefore, Defendants had 60 days, until September 15, 2025, in which to file this motion, and they did
so before that deadline. Ln any evawt | a5 Defeuctents aryve, even i £ the metim Les not tmela bieol
Uncles the 0-elm role, an dati-ShAYP motion ine, be Riteol "in the Courts discretion 0k on tere
‘ Yt
tk upon teans jt olseims proper.” (Cad2e Cl Foceolrt seohin 125.lr (£).) Given the comple PN
higtong involucel here, the dour Anole Defohats ‘mohin Himely 6A proper ly oelyre te "94-615352"
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
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Second, in evaluating whether to disregard a dismissal based on an agreement, courts look to the .
notion of fairness, “which in turn depends on the plaintiff's motivation and intent in dismissing his
complaint.” (Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Cobrae (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 538, 546.) A request for dismissal
is improper where its apparent purpose is to avoid an imminent adverse ruling. (Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996)
49 Cal.App.4th 765, 770-771.)'The court finds that Plaintiff did not dismiss defendants Singer Cashman
LLP, Adam S. Cashman, Adam G. Mehes, Allison Huebert, and Alex Spiro in good faith, since dein30
. oem oustrete .
nee the circumstances suggegt he was motivated
to avoid an adverse ruling in the present motion. (Alden Decl. {i 2-6.) Additionally, the court has
, stetements at istve here pristanil
|| furtherance of a person’s [constitutional] right of petition or free speech ... in connection with a public
jurisdiction to consider all counts that Defendants move to strike. Plaintiff has never attempted to dismiss
Counts IV-VIII, and Plaintiff did not properly move to dismiss Counts X, XUI-XV, XVII, and XIX until
Hird sect (25.1F Ce) Tegu ives het rhe stekcmevts ia
two days after Defendants filed the pr t motion,} ,” i
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Moving Defendants here move under CCP sections 425.16(e)(1) and (e)(3). Moving Defendants “
have demonstrated that as to them the challenged counts arise from protected speech and petitioning
activity. .
As alleged against Moving Defendants, Counts IV-VIII, X, XII-XV: and XVI arise from Moving
Defendants’ speech and petitioning activity. Arguably, Plaintiff has embedded causes of action within his
stated causes of action, but all discernable causes of action against Moving Defendants arise from Moving
Defendants’ speech or petitioning activity. The activities from which the causes of action arise fall into a
few categories. *
First, Plaintiff presents claims arising from statements made by Musk on Twitter or at media events
that were posted on YouTube, regarding the performance, innovation, and prospects of Tesla. (FAC {ff
79, 98, 189, 190, 263, 266, 272, 274.) Subdivision (e)(3) of section 425.16 provides that an “‘act in
issue’ includes ... any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public
forum in connection with an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ. Proc., section 425.16(e)(3).) “Websites
accessible to the public... are ‘public forums’ for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Cross v. Facebook,
Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 190, 199.) High-profile public figures, such as Musk, and public companies,
Case No, CGC-24-615352
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKEPage 6 Ay
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establish Moving Defendants’ speech and petitioning activities were illegal as a matter of law. Nor have
Moving Defendants so conceded. Thus, Moving Defendants are not precluded from-using the anti-SLAPP
statute to strike Plaintiff's claims against them. °
In sum, Moving Defendants carried their prong one burden showing that Plaintiffs’ claims against
them alleged as gg within Counts IV-VIII, X, XIN-XV and XVIII arise from Moving Defendants’
protected activity, either under subdivision (e)(1) or (e)(3). Therefore, the court will move on to the prong
two analysis. - .
Prong Two -
The court moves on to prong two, where it must decide whether, as to the causes of action arising
from protected activity, Plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing. (Civ. Code Proc., section
425.16, subd. (b).) Plaintiff has not met his burden of proof on prong two for any of the relevant causes
of action for several reasons, including claim preclusion, litigation privilege, the-running of statutes of
: anol an absence of evidenet +> Supporet the
Necessane Clements of his cle- ms
1. Count IV (Securities Fraud under California Corporations Code sections 25400 and 25500)
Section 25400 of the California Corporations Code prohibits various forms of market
manipulation, including creating false or misleading market appearances, inducing purchases or sales
through market manipulation, disseminating false or misleading information, and receiving consideration
for disseminating manipulative information. (Corp. Code § 25400.) Section 25500 establishes civil
liability for willful violations of section 25400. Liability under these provisions requires that the defendant
‘must have acted knowingly or with intent to deceive. (See Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036.)
Claim preclusion applies only when a second suit involves (1) the same cause of action (2) between
the same parties [or their privies] (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit. (Grande v.
Eisenhower Medical Center (2022) 13 Cal.5th 313, 323.) First, Defendants Musk and Tesla were parties
to the First Action in federal court in 2020. Although ExceSsion, the Musk Trust, Birchall, and Morgan
Stanley were not named parties, the court finds that they were in privity with the named parties. Plaintiff
‘|| himself pleads privity between Defendants (FAC §{ 75-78, 529), which includes “master and servant,
principal and agent, and indemnitor and indemnitee.” (Sartor v. Superior Court (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d
0 Case No. CGC-24-615352
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKEPage 8 —
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322, 326.) Second, this count involves the same “primary right” and is based on the same material
“conditions and facts in existence” as a count involved in the First Action, which also alleged securities °
fraud connected with Tesla’s stock price and product offerings. Third, the First Action was dismissed on
the merits, which constitutes a final judgment. (Alden Decl. § 10, Ex. E.). ~
Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden because he has not provided substantial
evidence of Moving Defendants’ knowledge or intent to deceive, which are necessary elements of a
securities fraud claim under section 25400. °
2. Count V (Securities Fraud under California Corporations Code sections 25401 and 25501)
Corporations Code section 25401 provides that “[i]t is unlawful for any person to offer or sell a
security in this state, or to buy or offer to buy a security in this state, by means of any written or oral
communication that includes an untrie statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact
necessary to'make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which the statements were -
made, not misleading.” (Corp. Code § 25401.) Section 25501 provides a private right of action for
individuals harmed by violations of section 25401 and provides for liability if the defendant failed to
exercise reasonable care and could have known of the untruth or omission. (People v. Simon (1995) 9,
Cal.4th 493, 510.) Section 25501 does not require proof of actual reliance by the plaintiff, but the
misrepresentation or omission must be material. (Mirkin v. Wasserman (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1082, 1100.) -
Here, for the same reasons.as above, claim preclusion bars this count. Additionally, Plaintiff has
failed to provide substantial evidence of specific material misrepresentations made to him by Moving
Defendants. Therefore, he has not met his burden to show a probability of prevailing on this count. .
3. Count VI (Assistance Committing Securities Fraud)
Corporations Codé section 25504.1 imposes joint and several liability on any person who
materially assists in violations of specified securities laws, including section 25401, with the intent to
deceive or defraud. To establish liability under section 25504.1, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
defendant materially assisted in the act constituting the securities law violation. This assistance must
involve some aspect of the violation itself, not merely participation in a broader fraudulent scheme. (AREJ
II Cases (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1012.) -
Case No. CGC-24-615352
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Again, this count is barred by claim preclusion. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to provide
substantial evidence of Moving Defendants’ intent to deceive or defraud, nor evidence that Moving
Defendants materially assisted in the furtherance of a specific violation. As such, he has not satisfied his
burden to show a probability of prevailing.
4. Count Vi (Fraud) -
“The elements which must be pleaded to plead a fraud claim are ‘(a) misrepresentation (false
representation, concealment or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or “scienter”); (c) intent to
defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.’” (Philipson & Simon
v. Gulsvig (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 347, 363.) Fraud must be pled with particularity: “when affirmative
representation fraud is alleged, this particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which ‘show how,
when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.”” (Ratiagan v, Uber
Fechnologies; Ine. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 41, citing Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp: (2004) 34
Cal.App.4th 979, 993.) :
. Again,.as above, this count is barred by claim preclusion. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to
provide substantial evidence demonstrating Moving Defendants’ scienter or intent to defraud. Further,
this count is barred by litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47(b). Section 47(b) provides that a
privileged publication or broadcast is one made “[iJn any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial
proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any .
other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section
1084) of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” (Civ. Code § 47(b).) The litigation privilege
provides absolute protection from tort liability for statements made in the course of any judicial or quasi-
judicial proceeding. (Mireskandari v. Gallagher (2020) 59 Cal.App.Sth 346, 365-366.) : °
Here, Plaintiff's fraud claim relies in substantial part on the allegation that “Defendants Musk, .
Tesla, Qazi, and Smick filed false and misleading documents in Greenspan I in order to defraud the court,
which had the material effect of leading to the improper dismissal of Greenspan I.” (FAC | 497.) These
documents receive absolute protection because they were made in the course of a judicial proceeding;
therefore, they cannot provide the basis for Plaintiff's claim. Therefore, Plaintiff has not met his burden
to show a probability of prevailing.
8 Case No. CGC-24-6 15352
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5. Count VII (Negligent Misrepresentation)
The elements of a cause of action for negligent mistepresentation are “1, The defendant must have
made a representation as to a past or existing material fact; 2. The representation must have been untrue;
3. Regardless of his actual belief the defendant must have made the representation without any reasonable
ground for believing it to be true; 4. The representation must have been made with the intent to induce
plaintiff to rely upon it; 5. The plaintiff must have been unaware of the falsity of the representation: he
must have acted in reliance upon the truth of the representation and he must have been justified in relying
upon the representation. 6. And, finally, as a result of his reliance upon the truth of the representation, the
plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (Continental Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1989)
216 Cal.App.3d 388, 402.) -
Again, as above, this count is barred by claim preclusion. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to meet
his burden by-presenting substantial evidence demonstrating Moving Defendants made any representation
without reasonable grounds for believing it to be true, nor evidence that any representation was made with
the intent to induce Plaintiff to rely upon it. Therefore, Plaintiff has not met his burden to show a
probability of prevailing.
6. Count X (Defamation perse) +
To establish a claim for defamation, the plaintiff must generally prove show “(1) a publication (2)
that is false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) having a natural tendency to injure or. causes special
damages.” (Bishop v. The Bishop’s School (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 893, 909.) Defamation per se exists
when “defamatory meaning appears from the language itself without the necessity of explanation or the
pleading of extrinsic facts.” (Palm Springs Tennis Club v. Rangel (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1,5.) °
Again, as above, this count is barred by claim preclusion. Additionally, this count relies on
allegations that Musk and Tesla are vicariously liable for Qazi’s purported defamatory statements;
however, Plaintiff has previously admitted that Qazi’s contract with Tesla explicitly disclaimed that Qazi
would work as Tesla’s legal agent, and the contract language itself also negates any agency relationship.
(Alden Decl. Ex. L, M) Plaintiff has provided no other evidence supporting a finding of vicarious liability.
The federal court in the First Action.explicitly rejected the allegation that Qazi was an agent of Musk or
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Tesla. (Alden Decl. Ex, E.) Because Plaintiff has not presented substantial evidence supporting vicarious
liability, he has not demonstrated a probability of prevajling on this count. — ,
7. Count XIII (NIED)
a
.
“Negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort in California, but is regarded
simply as the tort of negligence. (Citations omitted.) Whether plaintiffs can recover damages for NIED is,
dependent upon traditional tort analysis, and the elements of duty, breach of duty, causation and damages
must exist to support the cause of action.” (Klein v. Children’s Hospital Medical Center (1996) 46
Cal.App.4th 889, 894.) A duty of care may arise in three ways: (1) it may be imposed by law; (2) it may
be voluntarily assumed by the defendant; or (3) it may exist due to a preexisting special relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant (Friedman ¥. Merck & Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 454.)
Intentional acts cannot give rise to NIED claims. (See Semore v. Pool (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1105.) °
- Again, as above, this count is barred by claim preclusion. Additionally, Plaintiff has produced no
evidence demonstrating a probability of prevailing. First, Plaintiff has not pled that a duty of care existed:
Plaintiff's presence as a mere visitor at a Tesla showroom is insufficient to create a duty of care. (See
Friedman, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at 894.) Tesla’s anti-harassment employment policy does not set forth
a duty of care enforceable against Tesla by Plaintiff. Second, Plaintiff does not plead any negligent acts
to support his claim, only intentional “harassment,” which cannot support a claim for NIED. (FAC 574.)
Even if a negligent act occurred in December 2018, when Plaintiff alleges that he visited the Tesla
showroom, the two-year statute of limitations for a NIED claim has run. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1.)
Therefore, Plaintiff has not met his burden.
8: Count XIV (Fraud on the Court / Malicious Prosecution) ~ .
There are four elements to a malicious prosecution claim: “First, there had fo have been a prior
action “commenced by or at the direction of the defendant [that] was pursued to a legal termination in wee
[the] plaintiffs ... favor.” Sécond, the defendant must have brought the prior action without probable cause.
Third, the defendant must have initiated the prior action with malice. Fourth, the plaintiff must show
resulting damage, which may include out-of-pocket losses of attorney fees and costs, as well as emotional
distress and injury to reputation. (Citations omitted.)” (Maleti v. Wickers (2022) 82 Cal.App.Sth 181, 203.)
10 Case No. CGC-24-6 15352
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Plaintiff's case here revolves around the Second Acton in Alameda Superior Court for indemnity.
First of all, Plaintiff's claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.6, since the indemnity action terminated on May 1, 2023, and Plaintiff did not file this action
until June 12, 2024. (Alden Decl. Ex. O.) Additionally, Plaintiff has not produced substantial evidence
demonstrating plaintiffs in the Second: Action brought the action without probable cause or that they
initiated the Second Action with malice. *
9. Count XV (Negligence)
“The elements of a cause of action for negligence are (1) a legal duty to use reasonable care, (2)
breach of that duty, and (3) proximate cause between the breach and (4) the plaintiff's injury.” (Mendoza
v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1339.) A litigant or their attorney owes no duty of
care to an opponent. (Shelden Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863.)
Here, Plaintiff's claim-is based on allegations that “Defendant Musk and the ‘Hardcore Litigation
Department were grossly negligent and acted with reckless disregard in preparing and filing the Alameda
‘|| Complaint.” (FAC § 638.) As with Count VII, these filings are protected by: litigation privilege under Civil |
Code section 47(b). Further, Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that Moving Defendants owed
him a duty of care, especially considering the fact that they were his adversaries in litigation. Therefore,
Plaintiff has not met his burden.
10. Count XVII (UCL) °
L
California’s Unfair Competition Law prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or
practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1
(commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.” (Bus.
& Prof. Code § 17200.) California courts have recognized a balancing test in evaluating ¢laims under the
"unfair" prong of the UCL, which involves weighing the utility of the defendant's conduct against the
gravity of the harm to the alleged victim. (Schnall v. Hertz Corp. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1144.) “When a
|| UCL.claim is derivative of other substantive causes of actions, the dismissal of the antecedent substantive
causes of action necessarily means dismissal of the UCL claim.” (Uber Technologies Pricing Paces (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 963, 979, n. 10.)
11 Case No. CGC-24-6 15352
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS?’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKEPage 13 Se
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Here, Plaintiff's UCL claim is entirely derivative of his other claims, which the court has stricken;
therefore, the court strikes this count as well. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence to
demonstrate that Defendants engaged in any business practices where the harm to Plaintiff outweighed .
the utility of the conduct. Further, the UCL does not apply to securities transactions or cases where a
plaintiff seeks money damages, both of which are true here. (Bowen v. Ziasun Tech. Inc. (2004) 116
Cal.App.4th 777, 789-790, n. 9; Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 66 Cal.App.4th 364, 371.) Therefore,
Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing a probability of prevailing. ~~ Cead the elaine sittin there |
In sum, as against Moving Defendants, Plaintiff's Counts IV-VII, X, XIII-XV and XVIII/arise
from Moving Defendants’ speech and petitioning activity, and Plaintiff has failed to show that he is likely
to prevail on any of his causes of action against Moving Defendants. Plaintiff’s TV-VIII, X, XTII-XV and
XVII causes of action as against Moving Defendants are, thus stricken from the complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November {3, 2025
a
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aga, whied wes chene a4 Tle: nh Pls, [PROBOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS” SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
rjing.Page 14 CGC-24-615352 , ( AARON GREENSPAN VS. ELON” SK ET AL
NY
I, the undersigned, certify that I am an employee of the Superior Court of California, County Of San Francisco and not
a party to the above-entitled cause and that on November 24, 2025 I served the foregoing ; AMENDED ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANTS ELON MUSK, TESLA, INC., THE ELON MUSK REVOCABLE TRUST,
EXCESSION, LLC, JARED BIRCHALL, SINGER CASHMAN, LLP, ALLISON HUEBERT, ADAM S.
CASHMAN, ADAM G. MEHES, AND ALEX SPIRO'S SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE on each counsel of record
or party appearing in propria persona by causing a copy thereof to be enclosed in a postage paid sealed envelope and
deposited in the United States Postal Service mail box located at 400 McAllister Street, San Francisco CA 94102-
4514 pursuant to standard court practice. .
Date: November 24, 2025 By: MARIA BENIGNA GOODMAN
AARON GREENSPAN
440 N. BARRANCA AVE. #6720
COVINA, CA 91723
DANIELLE SHRADER-FRECHETTE
ANTHONY P. ALDEN
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
SULLIVAN LLP
865 S. FIGUEROA ST.
10TH FLOOR
LOS ANGELES, CA 90017
Certificate of Service — Form C00005010
PDF Page 1
PlainSite Cover Page
PDF Page 2
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FILED
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
AARON GREENSPAN, an individual,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
ELON MUSK, an individual, TESLA, INC., a
Delaware corporation, THE ELON MUSK
REVOCABLE TRUST DATED JULY 22, 2003,
a trust, X CORP., a Nevada corporation formerly
known as TWITTER, INC., EXCESSION, LLC, °
a Texas Limited Liability Company, JARED
BIRCHALL, an individual, MORGAN
STANLEY & COMPANY, LLC, a Delaware
Limited Liability Company, OMAR QAZI, an
individual, SMICK ENTERPRISES, INC., a
Delaware corporation, SINGER CASHMAN,
LLP, a California partnership, ADAM S.
CASHMAN, an individual, ALLISON
HUEBERT, an individual, ADAM G. MEHES,
an individual, and ALEX SPIRO, an individual,
and DOES 1-10, inclusive.
Defendants.
DY
Case No. CGC-24-615352
ull AmEenPED
RDER G TING
DEFENDANTS ELON MUSK, TESLA,
INC., THE ELON MUSK REVOCABLE
TRUST, EXCESSION, LLC, JARED
BIRCHALL, SINGER CASHMAN,
LLP, ALLISON HUEBERT, ADAM S.
CASHMAN, ADAM G. MEHES, AND
ALEX SPIRO’S SPECIAL MOTION
TO STRIKE —
Date: November 12, 2025
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Department: 302
Complaint Filed: June 12, 2024
FAC Filed: August 28, 2024
Remand Received: July 28, 2025
Trial Date: None set
[Remanded From Northern District of
California Case No. 3:24-cv-04647-MMC]
Case No. CGC-24-615352
PROPOS | ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
PDF Page 3
Hus |
i . ont .
AMENDOY
Pro d rderY)
Defendants Elon Musk; Tesla, Inc.; The Elon Musk Revocable Trust Dated July 22, 2003;
Excession, LLC; Jared Birchall; Singer Cashman LLP; Allison Huebert; Adam S. Cashman; Adam G.
Mehes; and Alex Spiro’s special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Aaron Greenspan identifies as a software developer, investor and short seller. Historically
he has shorted Tesla stock. He‘alleges that Defendants defamed him, defrauded him, stalked him, engaged
in unfair business practices, falsely advertised their products and inflicted emotional distress upon him.
His allegations are based principally on Defendants’ social media posts and public appearances, as well
recy lator
as repulater aiid litigation activity. The parties enjoy a long history of litigation with each other. In 2020,
Plaintiff sued some of the Moving Defendants in the federal district court (“First Action”). The federal
court dismissed the First Action, which dismissal was upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal. In the
meantime, some Defendants here sued Plaintiff in Alameda Superior Court (“Second Action”).
Ultimately, Defendants soon dismissed this action. After the dismissal, Plaintiff sought to file a cross-
complaint in the Alameda Superior Court, which effort failed. In 2024, Plaintiff filed the complaint in this —
action (“Third Action”). Plaintiff alleged 20 causes of action against 14 defendants. Based on Plaintiff s
federal securities and RICO claims, Defendants removed the action to federal court. On July 17, 2025, the
federal district court dismissed all federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state ‘
claims. Defendants’ pending anti-SLAPP motion was denied as moot. On July 28, 2025, the remaining :
state claims were remanded to this court: only Counts IV-XX remain. Moving Defendants now move to
strike 3 ae (Gectrities Fraud under Corp. Code 25400, 25500), V (Securities Fraud under Corp.
Code 25401, 25501), VI (Assistance Committing Securities Fraud), VII (Fraud), VIII (Negligent
Misrepresentation), X (Defamation per se), XIII (NIED), XIV (Fraud on the Court), XV (Negligence),
and XVII (UCL). Moving Defendants bring a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute
contending Plaintiffs causes of action against them arise from their speech and petitioning activity and
|| Plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing on any of his claims. Plaintiff opposes the motion. .
Evidentiary Rulings
Defendants’ request for judicial notice is ruled on as follows. The court denies the request as to
Exhibits A, B, C, and D. The court grants the request as to Exhibits E and F, which are unopposed. The
1Z. ,
Ofer trtenolenl Fert see-pp-1,2,3,4, 5, oF ) Case No, CGC-24-615352
PROROSE ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
PDF Page 4
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|| of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16,
——|
court denies the request as to Exhibits G, H, I, and J. The court grants the request as to Exhibit K, L, M,
N, and O, which are unopposed. The court denies the request as to Exhibit Q. °
Anti-SLAPP Analysis ,
“SLAPP” is an acronym for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, which are lawsuits
designed to chill the exercise of speech and petition rights. “The anti-SLAPP statute helps ‘combat
lawsuits designed to chill the exercise of free speech and petition rights’” (Park v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060.) Section 425.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides for a special motion to strike ‘[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution
or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue.’ (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)”
(Cabrera y. Alam (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1085.)
In deciding the merits of an anti-SLAPP motion, the court undertakes a two-step analysis. The first
step addresses whether a claim “arises from protected activity.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 1062.) A claim
“arises from protected activity” when “protected activity” forms a basis for the defendant’s liability. (Id.)
Put another way, to satisfy the requirements of the first prong, the defendant must show that protected
activity constitutes the “wrongful act forming the basis for ... liability” on that claim. (C.W. Howe
Partners Inc. v. Mooradian (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 688, 701.) “Protected activity,” in tum, is statutorily
defined. To meet prong one, defendants must show that plaintiff's claims arise from:
| (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing
made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial
body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made
in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any
other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right
subd. (e)(1)-(4).) >
The court broadly construes the anti-SLAPP statute and considers “the pleadings and supporting
and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based” to determine whether
2 Case No. CGC-24-615352
[PBO@POSED} ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
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the claims implicate protected petitioning activity under section 425.16(e). (Equilon Enters. v. Consumer
Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67; Code Civ. Proc., 425.16, subds. (a) & (b)(2).) The “critical
consideration” of the prong one test is “whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected
free speech or petitioning activity.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.) “The anti-SLAPP
statute’s definitional focus is not the form of the plaintiff's cause of action but, rather, the defendant’s
activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability — and whether that activity constitutes protected
speech or petitioning.” (Jd. at 92.) If the defendant fails to satisfy.this burden, then the special motion to
strike must be denied. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 76.) -
If the court finds the moving party has carried its burden on prong one the analysis moves to the
second prong. There, the court must decide whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of
prevailing on the challenged cause of action. (City of Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 76.) Plaintiffs must
“demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a prima facie showing of facts
to sustain a favorable judgment.” (Premier Med. Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee
Assn. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 464, 476.) Plaintiff need only demonstrate minimal merit. (Grewal v.
Jammu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977, 989.) In making this determination, the Court. does “not weigh
credibility, nor do[es] [it] evaluate weight to the evidence. Instead, [the Court] accepts as true all evidence
favorable to the plaintiff and assesses the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff's
submission as a matter of law.” (Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th
688, 699-700.) - jonok 3) that the bommenenel preceh exeeptin url Coleg Cri
Procedural Issues - awe ere m 125.14 (é) erplige " f
As a threshold issue, Plaintiff claims that 1) Moving Defendants’ motion was untimely, amd 2) the
coust lacks jurisdictiori over certain Defendants and claimg. The court is unpersuaded by eee ments,
First, when a case is remanded from federal court to state court, defendants receive a new 60-day
window to file an anti-SLAPP motion, measured from the date of remand. (Morin v. Rosenthal (2004)
122 Cal.App.4th 673) This case was remanded from federal court on July 17, 2025. (Alden Decl. Ex. K.)
Therefore, Defendants had 60 days, until September 15, 2025, in which to file this motion, and they did
so before that deadline. Ln any evawt | a5 Defeuctents aryve, even i £ the metim Les not tmela bieol
Uncles the 0-elm role, an dati-ShAYP motion ine, be Riteol "in the Courts discretion 0k on tere
‘ Yt
tk upon teans jt olseims proper.” (Cad2e Cl Foceolrt seohin 125.lr (£).) Given the comple PN
higtong involucel here, the dour Anole Defohats ‘mohin Himely 6A proper ly oelyre te "94-615352"
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
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Second, in evaluating whether to disregard a dismissal based on an agreement, courts look to the .
notion of fairness, “which in turn depends on the plaintiff's motivation and intent in dismissing his
complaint.” (Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Cobrae (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 538, 546.) A request for dismissal
is improper where its apparent purpose is to avoid an imminent adverse ruling. (Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996)
49 Cal.App.4th 765, 770-771.)'The court finds that Plaintiff did not dismiss defendants Singer Cashman
LLP, Adam S. Cashman, Adam G. Mehes, Allison Huebert, and Alex Spiro in good faith, since dein30
. oem oustrete .
nee the circumstances suggegt he was motivated
to avoid an adverse ruling in the present motion. (Alden Decl. {i 2-6.) Additionally, the court has
, stetements at istve here pristanil
|| furtherance of a person’s [constitutional] right of petition or free speech ... in connection with a public
jurisdiction to consider all counts that Defendants move to strike. Plaintiff has never attempted to dismiss
Counts IV-VIII, and Plaintiff did not properly move to dismiss Counts X, XUI-XV, XVII, and XIX until
Hird sect (25.1F Ce) Tegu ives het rhe stekcmevts ia
two days after Defendants filed the pr t motion,} ,” i
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Moving Defendants here move under CCP sections 425.16(e)(1) and (e)(3). Moving Defendants “
have demonstrated that as to them the challenged counts arise from protected speech and petitioning
activity. .
As alleged against Moving Defendants, Counts IV-VIII, X, XII-XV: and XVI arise from Moving
Defendants’ speech and petitioning activity. Arguably, Plaintiff has embedded causes of action within his
stated causes of action, but all discernable causes of action against Moving Defendants arise from Moving
Defendants’ speech or petitioning activity. The activities from which the causes of action arise fall into a
few categories. *
First, Plaintiff presents claims arising from statements made by Musk on Twitter or at media events
that were posted on YouTube, regarding the performance, innovation, and prospects of Tesla. (FAC {ff
79, 98, 189, 190, 263, 266, 272, 274.) Subdivision (e)(3) of section 425.16 provides that an “‘act in
issue’ includes ... any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public
forum in connection with an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ. Proc., section 425.16(e)(3).) “Websites
accessible to the public... are ‘public forums’ for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Cross v. Facebook,
Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 190, 199.) High-profile public figures, such as Musk, and public companies,
Case No, CGC-24-615352
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
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such as Tesla, are issues of public interest, which Plaintiff does not contest. (See Jackson v. Mayweather
(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1254; Ampex Corp. v. Cargle (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1576.) Plaintiff
presents claims, as well, on Musk’s statements to the press, As framed by Plaintiff, Musk was engaged in
speech in a public forum in connection with Tesla’s performance and new technology. Musk’s conduct,
as alleged, was protected activity under subdivision (e)(3). -
Plaintiff contends that Musks’s statements fall within the commercial speech exception under
section 425.17(c). The court is unpersuaded, since the commercial speech exception is construed narrowly
and does not apply to statements about a company’s future. (Simpson Strong-Tie Co. v. Gore (2010) 49
Cal.4th 12, 32; Six4Three, LLC v. Facebook, Inc. (2025) 109 Cal. App.Sth 635, 676-677.) .
‘Second, Plaintiff presents claims arising from California DMV proceedings, SEC filings and court |
pleadings, both in this case and prior cases. (FAC J 129, 162, 187, 335, 408, 465, 471, 497, 580, 592,
638, 672.) Subdivision (e)(1) of section 425.16 provides that an “act in furtherance of a person’s
[constitutional] right of petition or free speech ... in connection with a public issue’ includes ... any
written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any
other official proceeding authorized by law.” (Code Civ. Proc., section 425.16(e)(1).) Plaintiff specifically
alleges as common to all claims of what Tesla “informed different regulators.” (FAC § 129.) Plaintiff also
alleges that Defendants “filed false and misleading documents” in Plaintiffs 2020 federal case against
Defendants (FAC { 497) and engaged in fraud regarding Plaintiffs case in Alameda County. (FAC ff]
580, 592, 638). Both regulatory filings and litigation filings are protected activities under subdivision
(e)(1). *
Plaintiff frames Moving Defendants’ activities as illegal conduct outside the scope of anti-SLAPP
|| protection, citing Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299. “Where a defendant brings a motion to strike
under section 425.16 based on a claim that the plaintiffs action arises from activity by the defendant in
furtherance of the defendant's exercise of protected speech or petition rights, but either the defendant
concedes, or the evidence conclusively establishes, that the assertedly protected speech or petition activity .
was illegal as a matter of law, the defendant is precluded from using the anti-SLAPP statute to strike the
plaintiff's action.” Flatley, however, held only that anti-SLAPP protection does not extend to conduct that
is “illegal as a matter of law” (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 320.) Here, the record does not conclusively
A
5 Case No. CGC-24-615352
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
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322, 326.) Second, this count involves the same “primary right” and is based on the same material
“conditions and facts in existence” as a count involved in the First Action, which also alleged securities °
fraud connected with Tesla’s stock price and product offerings. Third, the First Action was dismissed on
the merits, which constitutes a final judgment. (Alden Decl. § 10, Ex. E.). ~
Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden because he has not provided substantial
evidence of Moving Defendants’ knowledge or intent to deceive, which are necessary elements of a
securities fraud claim under section 25400. °
2. Count V (Securities Fraud under California Corporations Code sections 25401 and 25501)
Corporations Code section 25401 provides that “[i]t is unlawful for any person to offer or sell a
security in this state, or to buy or offer to buy a security in this state, by means of any written or oral
communication that includes an untrie statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact
necessary to'make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which the statements were -
made, not misleading.” (Corp. Code § 25401.) Section 25501 provides a private right of action for
individuals harmed by violations of section 25401 and provides for liability if the defendant failed to
exercise reasonable care and could have known of the untruth or omission. (People v. Simon (1995) 9,
Cal.4th 493, 510.) Section 25501 does not require proof of actual reliance by the plaintiff, but the
misrepresentation or omission must be material. (Mirkin v. Wasserman (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1082, 1100.) -
Here, for the same reasons.as above, claim preclusion bars this count. Additionally, Plaintiff has
failed to provide substantial evidence of specific material misrepresentations made to him by Moving
Defendants. Therefore, he has not met his burden to show a probability of prevailing on this count. .
3. Count VI (Assistance Committing Securities Fraud)
Corporations Codé section 25504.1 imposes joint and several liability on any person who
materially assists in violations of specified securities laws, including section 25401, with the intent to
deceive or defraud. To establish liability under section 25504.1, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
defendant materially assisted in the act constituting the securities law violation. This assistance must
involve some aspect of the violation itself, not merely participation in a broader fraudulent scheme. (AREJ
II Cases (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1012.) -
Case No. CGC-24-615352
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
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Again, this count is barred by claim preclusion. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to provide
substantial evidence of Moving Defendants’ intent to deceive or defraud, nor evidence that Moving
Defendants materially assisted in the furtherance of a specific violation. As such, he has not satisfied his
burden to show a probability of prevailing.
4. Count Vi (Fraud) -
“The elements which must be pleaded to plead a fraud claim are ‘(a) misrepresentation (false
representation, concealment or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or “scienter”); (c) intent to
defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.’” (Philipson & Simon
v. Gulsvig (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 347, 363.) Fraud must be pled with particularity: “when affirmative
representation fraud is alleged, this particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which ‘show how,
when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.”” (Ratiagan v, Uber
Fechnologies; Ine. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 41, citing Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp: (2004) 34
Cal.App.4th 979, 993.) :
. Again,.as above, this count is barred by claim preclusion. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to
provide substantial evidence demonstrating Moving Defendants’ scienter or intent to defraud. Further,
this count is barred by litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47(b). Section 47(b) provides that a
privileged publication or broadcast is one made “[iJn any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial
proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any .
other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section
1084) of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” (Civ. Code § 47(b).) The litigation privilege
provides absolute protection from tort liability for statements made in the course of any judicial or quasi-
judicial proceeding. (Mireskandari v. Gallagher (2020) 59 Cal.App.Sth 346, 365-366.) : °
Here, Plaintiff's fraud claim relies in substantial part on the allegation that “Defendants Musk, .
Tesla, Qazi, and Smick filed false and misleading documents in Greenspan I in order to defraud the court,
which had the material effect of leading to the improper dismissal of Greenspan I.” (FAC | 497.) These
documents receive absolute protection because they were made in the course of a judicial proceeding;
therefore, they cannot provide the basis for Plaintiff's claim. Therefore, Plaintiff has not met his burden
to show a probability of prevailing.
8 Case No. CGC-24-6 15352
[PRQEQ8ED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
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5. Count VII (Negligent Misrepresentation)
The elements of a cause of action for negligent mistepresentation are “1, The defendant must have
made a representation as to a past or existing material fact; 2. The representation must have been untrue;
3. Regardless of his actual belief the defendant must have made the representation without any reasonable
ground for believing it to be true; 4. The representation must have been made with the intent to induce
plaintiff to rely upon it; 5. The plaintiff must have been unaware of the falsity of the representation: he
must have acted in reliance upon the truth of the representation and he must have been justified in relying
upon the representation. 6. And, finally, as a result of his reliance upon the truth of the representation, the
plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (Continental Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1989)
216 Cal.App.3d 388, 402.) -
Again, as above, this count is barred by claim preclusion. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to meet
his burden by-presenting substantial evidence demonstrating Moving Defendants made any representation
without reasonable grounds for believing it to be true, nor evidence that any representation was made with
the intent to induce Plaintiff to rely upon it. Therefore, Plaintiff has not met his burden to show a
probability of prevailing.
6. Count X (Defamation perse) +
To establish a claim for defamation, the plaintiff must generally prove show “(1) a publication (2)
that is false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) having a natural tendency to injure or. causes special
damages.” (Bishop v. The Bishop’s School (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 893, 909.) Defamation per se exists
when “defamatory meaning appears from the language itself without the necessity of explanation or the
pleading of extrinsic facts.” (Palm Springs Tennis Club v. Rangel (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1,5.) °
Again, as above, this count is barred by claim preclusion. Additionally, this count relies on
allegations that Musk and Tesla are vicariously liable for Qazi’s purported defamatory statements;
however, Plaintiff has previously admitted that Qazi’s contract with Tesla explicitly disclaimed that Qazi
would work as Tesla’s legal agent, and the contract language itself also negates any agency relationship.
(Alden Decl. Ex. L, M) Plaintiff has provided no other evidence supporting a finding of vicarious liability.
The federal court in the First Action.explicitly rejected the allegation that Qazi was an agent of Musk or
9 "Case No. CGC-24-615352
PROPOSED) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
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Tesla. (Alden Decl. Ex, E.) Because Plaintiff has not presented substantial evidence supporting vicarious
liability, he has not demonstrated a probability of prevajling on this count. — ,
7. Count XIII (NIED)
a
.
“Negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort in California, but is regarded
simply as the tort of negligence. (Citations omitted.) Whether plaintiffs can recover damages for NIED is,
dependent upon traditional tort analysis, and the elements of duty, breach of duty, causation and damages
must exist to support the cause of action.” (Klein v. Children’s Hospital Medical Center (1996) 46
Cal.App.4th 889, 894.) A duty of care may arise in three ways: (1) it may be imposed by law; (2) it may
be voluntarily assumed by the defendant; or (3) it may exist due to a preexisting special relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant (Friedman ¥. Merck & Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 454.)
Intentional acts cannot give rise to NIED claims. (See Semore v. Pool (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1105.) °
- Again, as above, this count is barred by claim preclusion. Additionally, Plaintiff has produced no
evidence demonstrating a probability of prevailing. First, Plaintiff has not pled that a duty of care existed:
Plaintiff's presence as a mere visitor at a Tesla showroom is insufficient to create a duty of care. (See
Friedman, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at 894.) Tesla’s anti-harassment employment policy does not set forth
a duty of care enforceable against Tesla by Plaintiff. Second, Plaintiff does not plead any negligent acts
to support his claim, only intentional “harassment,” which cannot support a claim for NIED. (FAC 574.)
Even if a negligent act occurred in December 2018, when Plaintiff alleges that he visited the Tesla
showroom, the two-year statute of limitations for a NIED claim has run. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1.)
Therefore, Plaintiff has not met his burden.
8: Count XIV (Fraud on the Court / Malicious Prosecution) ~ .
There are four elements to a malicious prosecution claim: “First, there had fo have been a prior
action “commenced by or at the direction of the defendant [that] was pursued to a legal termination in wee
[the] plaintiffs ... favor.” Sécond, the defendant must have brought the prior action without probable cause.
Third, the defendant must have initiated the prior action with malice. Fourth, the plaintiff must show
resulting damage, which may include out-of-pocket losses of attorney fees and costs, as well as emotional
distress and injury to reputation. (Citations omitted.)” (Maleti v. Wickers (2022) 82 Cal.App.Sth 181, 203.)
10 Case No. CGC-24-6 15352
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
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Plaintiff's case here revolves around the Second Acton in Alameda Superior Court for indemnity.
First of all, Plaintiff's claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.6, since the indemnity action terminated on May 1, 2023, and Plaintiff did not file this action
until June 12, 2024. (Alden Decl. Ex. O.) Additionally, Plaintiff has not produced substantial evidence
demonstrating plaintiffs in the Second: Action brought the action without probable cause or that they
initiated the Second Action with malice. *
9. Count XV (Negligence)
“The elements of a cause of action for negligence are (1) a legal duty to use reasonable care, (2)
breach of that duty, and (3) proximate cause between the breach and (4) the plaintiff's injury.” (Mendoza
v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1339.) A litigant or their attorney owes no duty of
care to an opponent. (Shelden Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863.)
Here, Plaintiff's claim-is based on allegations that “Defendant Musk and the ‘Hardcore Litigation
Department were grossly negligent and acted with reckless disregard in preparing and filing the Alameda
‘|| Complaint.” (FAC § 638.) As with Count VII, these filings are protected by: litigation privilege under Civil |
Code section 47(b). Further, Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that Moving Defendants owed
him a duty of care, especially considering the fact that they were his adversaries in litigation. Therefore,
Plaintiff has not met his burden.
10. Count XVII (UCL) °
L
California’s Unfair Competition Law prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or
practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1
(commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.” (Bus.
& Prof. Code § 17200.) California courts have recognized a balancing test in evaluating ¢laims under the
"unfair" prong of the UCL, which involves weighing the utility of the defendant's conduct against the
gravity of the harm to the alleged victim. (Schnall v. Hertz Corp. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1144.) “When a
|| UCL.claim is derivative of other substantive causes of actions, the dismissal of the antecedent substantive
causes of action necessarily means dismissal of the UCL claim.” (Uber Technologies Pricing Paces (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 963, 979, n. 10.)
11 Case No. CGC-24-6 15352
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS?’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
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Here, Plaintiff's UCL claim is entirely derivative of his other claims, which the court has stricken;
therefore, the court strikes this count as well. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence to
demonstrate that Defendants engaged in any business practices where the harm to Plaintiff outweighed .
the utility of the conduct. Further, the UCL does not apply to securities transactions or cases where a
plaintiff seeks money damages, both of which are true here. (Bowen v. Ziasun Tech. Inc. (2004) 116
Cal.App.4th 777, 789-790, n. 9; Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 66 Cal.App.4th 364, 371.) Therefore,
Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing a probability of prevailing. ~~ Cead the elaine sittin there |
In sum, as against Moving Defendants, Plaintiff's Counts IV-VII, X, XIII-XV and XVIII/arise
from Moving Defendants’ speech and petitioning activity, and Plaintiff has failed to show that he is likely
to prevail on any of his causes of action against Moving Defendants. Plaintiff’s TV-VIII, X, XTII-XV and
XVII causes of action as against Moving Defendants are, thus stricken from the complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November {3, 2025
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CGC-24-615352 , ( AARON GREENSPAN VS. ELON” SK ET AL
NY
I, the undersigned, certify that I am an employee of the Superior Court of California, County Of San Francisco and not
a party to the above-entitled cause and that on November 24, 2025 I served the foregoing ; AMENDED ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANTS ELON MUSK, TESLA, INC., THE ELON MUSK REVOCABLE TRUST,
EXCESSION, LLC, JARED BIRCHALL, SINGER CASHMAN, LLP, ALLISON HUEBERT, ADAM S.
CASHMAN, ADAM G. MEHES, AND ALEX SPIRO'S SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE on each counsel of record
or party appearing in propria persona by causing a copy thereof to be enclosed in a postage paid sealed envelope and
deposited in the United States Postal Service mail box located at 400 McAllister Street, San Francisco CA 94102-
4514 pursuant to standard court practice. .
Date: November 24, 2025 By: MARIA BENIGNA GOODMAN
AARON GREENSPAN
440 N. BARRANCA AVE. #6720
COVINA, CA 91723
DANIELLE SHRADER-FRECHETTE
ANTHONY P. ALDEN
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
SULLIVAN LLP
865 S. FIGUEROA ST.
10TH FLOOR
LOS ANGELES, CA 90017
Certificate of Service — Form C00005010
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